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RIGHTIST RITUAL, MEMORY AND IDENTITY
COMMEMORATION IN LATE IMPERIAL
RUSSIA
This article explores how Russia’s right-wing groups drew upon concepts of memory and
identity commemoration to inform their ritual practices. Their creation of various memor-
ials, celebrations and cults represented a synthesis between conservative values of Orthodoxy,
autocracy and Russian nationality, and a populist nationalist appeal that came to define the
ideology and practice of the Russian ultra-right in the final years of tsarism. The analysis
includes three different case studies. First, it explores the creation of a leadership cult
amongst the radical right, assessing how followers celebrated the memory of the leader of
the Russian Monarchist Party, Vladimir Gringmut, after 1907. Second, it analyses the
activity of one of the most militant groups on the Russian far right, the Union of
Russian People, in Ukraine during 1905–07. Finally, it considers the activity of the
Union of the Arkhangel Mikhail in Bessarabia and their staging of commemorative activities
in celebration of the centenary of Bessarabia’s incorporation into the Russian Empire, held in
1912. All of these examples demonstrate how an illiberal, populist monarchism was devel-
oping away from the Russian state and even in conflict with it.
The funeral of the Russian monarchist leader Vladimir Gringmut in October 1907 drew
thousands of supporters from across the empire to central Moscow. The crowds formed
processions, which hoisted aloft banners and flags, and sang songs as they wound
through Red Square to the nearby Skorbiashchenskii monastery. This event was a power-
ful visual demonstration of monarchist values, providing a public forum for ideals to be
shared between leaders and followers. Supporters of Gringmut subsequently presented
this event as sacrosanct, detached from politics and calm; indeed, the demonstration,
despite the agitated state of the large crowds, passed off peacefully.1 Followers described
Gringmut as the leader of the monarchist movement and a spiritual figurehead for all of
the Russian people to unite around.2 Rightist groups and their leaders used the power of
social phenomena such as funerals, requiems and monuments celebrating the lives and
deaths of Russian rightists to promote their own values, providing followers with oppor-
tunities to see, hear and even touch the values of popular monarchism. These emotive
occasions, which included funerals such as Gringmut’s, were used to inculcate certain
cultural ideals in followers; however, they also proved to be contested events.
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The central subjects of study in this article – ‘the right’ or ‘rightists’ – refer to a
distinctive set of interests: the right-wing groups that emerged after 1900 and especially
during the revolution of 1905. These are sometimes known in the historiography as the
right-wing parties, monarchists or ‘black hundreds.’3 Two groups from this faction, the
Russian Monarchist Party (RMP) and the Union of Russian People (URP), will be under
special consideration, though examples of other major monarchist groups such as the
Russian Assembly, the Union of Russian Men (URM) and the Union of Archangel
Mikhail (UAM) will be drawn upon where appropriate.4 Rather than attempting to
present a single sociological thesis on the power of ritual, this article will draw on a
range of telling historical examples in order to illuminate how right-wing rituals
were used for mobilisation purposes, with the aim of building support for such
groups. Three separate studies (Vladimir Gringmut from 1907, URP funerals in
Ukraine from 1905–07 and rightist involvement in the Bessarabia centennial celebra-
tions of 1912) illustrate how rightist rituals in the early twentieth century were devel-
oping separately from the autocracy. Together they formed an alternate vision of how
popular monarchism could be constructed, which led to the creation of an independent
right-wing ritual subculture. This argument will be explored by examining right-wing
violence, the use of anti-Semitism, nationalism in non-Russian areas of the empire, and
the creation of both Russian and non-Russian identities.
Though rightists had appeared before 1905, events in the revolutionary era includ-
ing military defeat to Japan in the war from 1904 to 1905, the revolution of 1905, the
promulgation of the October Manifesto and the convocation of a legislative elected par-
liament all functioned as catalysts for a wider process of right-wing group formation.
Many groups on the right and the left attempted to harness popular support in
Russia’s semi-constitutional system. However, given that groups such as the URP and
RMP reacted to the political developments of the era with dismay, it comes as no
great surprise to discover that their associated ritual practices drew upon older symbolic
forms, untainted by what they perceived as the corrupting effects of contemporary
decline. This included frequent recourse to Orthodox iconography, as associated with
the church service, liturgies and icon processions, prayers to ‘the fatherland’ (otechestvo),
images of the resurrection of Christ, banners with traditional Slavonic lettering and
images of saints such as Georgii Pobedonosets (significantly, the surname means the
bringer of victory) who appeared on the URP badge.5 Such themes were derived
from the ideals of ‘official nationality’ (Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality) promoted
by the Romanov dynasty itself,6 and the techniques used on the right mirrored those of
the monarchy, which also celebrated past military victories, developed patriotic music
and held national celebrations and festivals.7 Like other social and political groups, right-
ists used rituals to attempt to secure public support. Reflecting wider trends in contem-
porary Europe, rightists desired that these demonstrations in the theatre of public life
would have a degree of popular resonance by appealing to the masses.8
In assessing the right’s use of rituals and symbols, several wider conclusions can be
drawn. First, the public demonstration of these rituals demonstrates the alternative view
of the monarchy promoted by autonomous right-wing movements. Whilst rightists
adopted the regime’s ethos, most notably by sharing the banner of official nationality,
they added new elements to those in existence, creating a synthesis between official
and popular monarchism. Furthermore, there were ideological distinctions developing
between the two tendencies. A shared agreement on the importance of Russian
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nationality did not prohibit different interpretations of that same principle.9 The con-
straints – or lack thereof – placed upon the right by the tsarist authorities can shed
light on the relationship between Russia’s rulers and the forces of right-wing radicalism.
Second, analysing rituals and symbols can help us to understand the popular impact of
the right by looking at how they demonstrated their consecrated system of values in
public. Linked to this was the success of the right’s attempts to woo the masses.
Whilst rightists may have claimed a degree of popular support, how successful were
they in actually achieving this aim? Third, the right’s uses of rituals and symbols can
tell us where the right fitted into the wider social, cultural and political context of
late imperial Russia, by showing how they perceived a rapidly changing socio-cultural
environment, and also how other national, political and religious groups reacted to
them.
Right-wing tactics and the use of rituals
The adoption of ‘the people’ as part of a national myth had been previously pursued by
the imperial regime in the idea of the ‘good tsar.’10 Though right-wing groups were also
committed to the ideology of ‘official nationality’, constructing rituals was in reality a
dynamic process that led to the creation of scenarios that were in effect a departure from
those long espoused by the regime. There are several ways in which to view this contrast
between theory and practice, though one useful distinction is that between public and
private rituals. In private, rightists commonly feted reactionary ‘tough’ heroes such
as Alexander III, but in public, rightists chose subjects that they believed had a
greater popular resonance. One example was the presentation of a bust in honour of
Alexander II, the ‘tsar liberator’, in September 1912 in Vladimir province in front of
monarchist peasants. Attended by representatives from the Vorshinskii branch of the
URP, the right attempted to show that tsarism still had popular support whilst attempt-
ing to establish its own credentials as a movement of the people. In choosing the ‘tsar
liberator’, monarchists desired to reach out to peasants by showing them how they too
venerated the tsar who had emancipated the peasants from serfdom in 1861. After local
peasants had sung pro-autocracy hymns, V. M. Koriakin, a URP activist, gave a speech
about ‘the important events from the life of the tsar-martyr, since the peasants asked
why he submitted to the feelings of his loyal subjects.’11 The presentation of the tsar
as a martyr dying for his subjects was a theme embedded deep in the Orthodox tra-
dition. Conservatives had reacted strongly to this image long before the right
emerged in our period. For instance, the Slavophile publicist and thinker Ivan
Aksakov wrote the following tribute to Alexander II after his assassination in 1881:
God raised the humble one to a height above any earthly height . . . Whose hand
there was ready to go into battle for the defence of his throne . . . a whole ocean
of people, was worthy to die truly martyred. His image stands before us now in
the radiant glory of a passion-sufferer.12
The powerful image of martyrdom was one example of how ritual demonstrations,
developed on the right, attempted to arouse the emotions and feelings of the people
observing them, though with the important caveat that these applied only to ethnic,
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Orthodox Russians.13 Another instance was in the bicentennial anniversary of the battle
of Poltava, held in the spring of 1909. The celebrations were portrayed by rightists such
as Father Ioann Vostorgov as mass events involving the people (narod), and in so doing
rightists provided a vision of unity between elites and masses. Whilst the Petrine legacy
was not a conservative one, the great military victory over Sweden in 1709 allowed even
ardent rightists such as Vostorgov to interpret Peter’s legacy positively, even though it
had often been disparaged for its ‘Westernism’ in conservative circles.14 These examples
show how rightists, in seeking a mass audience, could use ritual practices in pursuit of
mass support.
Many of these rituals involved the theme of death, which provided potential
common ground between rightists and their intended audience. The Russian right
desired that rituals involving this preoccupation cross classes and provide unity
between people, tsar and the monarchist movements.15 In using this theme the right
had chosen an influential idea with clear social significance. For example, in Russia’s
peasant community, death rituals were used to create a meaningful way of dealing
with high mortality rates.16 Given high rates of both illiteracy and mortality in many
of Russia’s peasant communities, it is obvious why rightists may have placed special
attention on images and symbols surrounding death in order to win support, rather
than written texts. If they are carefully constructed and given the correct thematic
appeal for their intended audience, public rituals can successfully demonstrate a conse-
crated symbolic system, which functions as a ‘cultural performance’ imposing an order
on apparently chaotic and arbitrary events.17 Modes of the performance may vary. For
instance, religious symbols used in funerals and memorials can serve to visualise
‘ancestor worship’, signifying respect for generations past and ties to the wider commu-
nity.18 These themes were directly linked with rightist activities, which emphasised ideas
of community, tradition, observance and religion. Examples included ‘union banners,
peasant choirs, church services, requiems and other purely religious rites that usually
occupied no less a place than patriotic manifestations and the sending of telegrams.’19
The goal of such rituals was to legitimise the rightist social order. The creation of
‘sacred space’ in public is an important part of this process, an area where the sanctity of
what is taking place in front of observers cannot be questioned and takes on a detached,
mythic and timeless quality independent of the normal plane of human activity.20 A
novel development of certain right-wing rituals was that, unlike in the scenarios of
the autocracy, the role of the narod changed from an essentially abstract focus, shared
with the tsars, to the explicit personification of rightist favourites and followers.
Ideas of protecting the sanctity of the people can be seen in the construction of the
‘Memorial Church of Russian Sorrows’ in Khodynka, Moscow by the Ekaterinoslav
branch of the URP between 1905 and 1909. This was dedicated to ‘2,000 victims of
revolution’, one of whom was Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, killed by revolution-
aries in Moscow in 1905. The remaining were all normal people, ‘true tsarist subjects’,
killed by subversive forces in the new ‘years of troubles’ (smutnye gody).21 These ‘sub-
versive forces’ were often taken to mean Jews and other national minorities by rightist
activists, and many of these foes were also drawn from the political class. A combination
of positive and negative ideals comprised a series of images, which Russian rightists
desired would have emotional resonance for followers. Rightists used a mass-circulation
press, public demonstrations, deployment of orators and activists, and the construction
of memorials as techniques in aid of disseminating a message that they were groups on
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the side of the Russian people.22 Together they represented a move towards populist
nationalist ideology from the autonomous right, with the attendant rituals performing
the function of publicly legitimising such beliefs. All of these practices took place in
the public realm shared with the state, but developed apart from it. Though rightists
largely adhered to the same principles as the regime, they created an alternate vision
of monarchy and empire in the late imperial period in response to processes of social
and political change.
Vladimir Andreevich Gringmut: a vozhd’ of the movement
The funeral and deification of Vladimir Gringmut by his followers was one instance of
the right-wing parties celebrating their own heroes of the movement. Though this was a
peaceful event, followers criticised the realities of the Russian present as created by the
regime and, in doing so, highlighted the reactionary nature of Russian rightist forces.23
Gringmut was the editor of the monarchist newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti (Moscow
News) from 1896, and creator and leader of the RMP from 24 April 1905 until his
death on 28 September 1907.24 Large crowds gathering on 1 October to mark Gring-
mut’s passing showed that an independent right had emerged that could mobilise a sig-
nificant number of followers. In several respects the symbolism of the funeral, which
drew on Orthodox religiosity and the power of Russian autocracy, mirrored the ideol-
ogy of the regime. On the day of the funeral, a crowd of several thousand followers, led
by the monk and orator Father Ioann Vostorgov, a close confidant of Gringmut and
himself a leader of the RMP, gathered at Red Square to chant slogans and sing Orthodox
hymns. Many of these musical renditions, such as ‘God is with us’ (bog s nami) and verses
from Mikhail Glinka’s 1836 opera ‘A Life for the Tsar’ (Zhizn’ za tsaria) were typical of
monarchist ritual. The procession formed at his funeral and wound its way from In Red
Square, where several thousand followers and leaders of the movement had gathered,
along Malaia-Dmitrovka and Dolgorovka streets to Skorbiashchenskii monastery. The
funeral was a powerful visual demonstration of Orthodox religiosity, with the icons
and flags of the RMP depicting various saints, the Virgin Mary and, of course, Gringmut
himself. Supporters sang ‘God save us!’ and carried Orthodox crosses along the proces-
sion route. The interment of Gringmut occurred in the monastery that evening. Repor-
tage from the event declared that ‘the meaning of this will be fixed in popular
memory’,25 and emphasised the peaceful nature of the crowds.26
Monarchist followers described Gringmut’s funeral, not without some justification,
as a mass event that had attracted a broad cross-section of society.27 One sympathetic
source estimated that over 30,000 people were present.28 This estimate seems high,
though an important piece of surviving evidence is a series of photographs from the
event, which shows crowds of at least several thousand (Figures 1 and 2). The crowd
attending the event appeared to be socially mixed. Smartly attired men, some in
uniform, peasant women in headscarves, as well as the drably dressed and not clearly
identifiable were all present amongst the throng of supporters carrying banners and
flags. Among those present were leaders of dozens of provincial branches of the
RMP, various delegates representing a number of other monarchist groups from
across the empire, the governor-general of Moscow, V. F. Dzhunkovskii, and Metropo-
litan Vladimir of Moscow and Kolomenskoe. The social base of the demonstration was
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FIGURE 1 Crowds in Moscow for Gringmut’s funeral, 1 October 1907.
Source: Vladimir Andreevich Gringmut: ocherk ego zhizni i deiatel’nosti, Moscow: A. A. Levenson,
1913, p. 118. Courtesy of the Slavonic Library, National Library of Finland.
FIGURE 2 Gringmut’s funeral procession, 1 October 1907.
Source: Vladimir Andreevich Gringmut: ocherk ego zhizni i deiatel’nosti, Moscow: A. A. Levenson,
1913, p. 119. Courtesy of the Slavonic Library, National Library of Finland.
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important, as rightists were generally keen to portray a degree of mass support. This
event was portrayed as ‘cross estate’ (soslovie), aimed at both the elites and the
masses, appealing for unity via the use of transcendent symbols of Orthodoxy and
nationality, rather than political emblems.29
Much of the symbolism and iconography of the Gringmut cult was not novel.
Several rightist groups, such as the Russian Assembly, frequently praised other conser-
vative heroes like Alexander III using similar symbolism and language.30 However, a key
difference was that the Gringmut cult had autonomous origins, and hence represented
the development of an independent movement. Furthermore, there was a growing
emphasis on Gringmut’s role within the wider monarchist movement. The secular
aspects of the Gringmut cult emphasised his personal values as a dynamic and indepen-
dent leader of the movement. He was presented not only as an outstanding figure, but
the focus of all convictions, and a warrior (bogatyr’).31 His supporters saw him as the
‘outstanding individual talent’ in the earliest years of the formation of a nationwide,
mass-scale monarchist movement, and wished to demonstrate this through his cult.32
In this way Gringmut’s ‘leadership cult’ demonstrated some commonality with those
of fascist and totalitarian regimes later on; however, rightists typically stressed unity,
nationality and religion in their own cults, and, of course, their own leaders’ roles
could not completely override that of the tsar.33 The cult’s symbolism was a unique
mixture, consisting of Russian Orthodox symbols long familiar to followers, and also
iconography that presented the individual as a ‘heroic’ personality.34
Once the funeral was over, the focus turned to the legacy of Gringmut. Despite pro-
testations from Gringmut’s supporters that his legacy was not political, the role of politics
warrants consideration as part of the scenario. Whilst the development of a Gringmut cult
was not in obvious conflict with the regime, followers criticised widespread decline in con-
temporary Russia, and saw that Gringmut had a ‘mission’ to restore the nation. According
to Boris Nazarevskii, chair of the Russian Monarchist Society writing in the newspaper
Staraia Moskva (Old Moscow), this was to re-energise the Russian people, in spirit and reli-
gion, as well as to create a party machine.35 At a requiem (panikhida) for Gringmut, held
at the Skorbiashchenskii monastery on 30 March 1908, a crowd of bishops, archiman-
drites, priests and members of the RMP sang monarchist hymns, including arias from
Glinka’s opera, and listened to a speech given by URP member and right-wing commen-
tator A. S. Shmakov, which opined on threats to Russia in the political era. In contrast to
Nazarevskii’s tribute, Shmakov’s speech was more aggressive: essentially, it was a lengthy
criticism of the recently established State Duma. Shmakov argued that the Duma was only
interested in ‘passing Jewish laws’, and stood as the foremost bridge between the self-
realisation of the Russian people and the spiritual degeneration of the nation. This
echoed the ideas of Gringmut, who had been a virulent anti-Semite and opponent of
the Duma system.36 As Gringmut had declared in an editorial in June 1906, the leadership
of the monarchist movement would carry out the ‘will of the tsar’ and would co-operate
with the Duma only grudgingly. Gringmut’s legacy attracted diatribes against politics, and
demonstrates the negative core of the cult, as his supporters widely decried the situation in
contemporary Russia.37
Gringmut was a headmaster at the Tsarevich Nikolai Lyceum in Moscow between
1870 and 1895. Playing on this previous role, the theme of Gringmut as teacher was
prominent in a report from 30 September 1908. RMP member I. A. Kolesnikov had
arrived in Moscow to open a school established in Gringmut’s name, aiming to carry
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on his brand of teachings. This reveals the priority that youth groups were accorded by
monarchists. Followers such as Kolesnikov claimed that Gringmut was more than a pol-
itical leader – he was also described as a spiritual teacher of Russia’s youth. Continuing
the theme from the funeral itself of appealing to the masses as well as the elites, the
school was free and ostensibly aimed at poor students. One quote described him as
‘the dear leader and unifier of the Russian people, father-warrior (bogatyr’) Gringmut.’38
In a similar tribute from July 1909, B. V. Nazarevskii reported to delegates at a confer-
ence in Moscow that a church school in Siberia had opened, primarily aimed at peasants,
which gave special instruction on Gringmut’s life and teaching. Selected spiritual texts,
Gringmut’s own works and RMP pamphlets would be distributed amongst the students,
as in the case of the school in Moscow.39
Monarchist propaganda presented Gringmut’s most outstanding personal achieve-
ment as organisation and leadership of the wider monarchist movement, and relegated
his role as a thinker to secondary status. Here, Gringmut’s role as a political leader was
emphasised. In one tribute from a rightist journalist, Nikolai Chernikov (a member of
the Russian Assembly), he was seen as an outstanding publicist in light of his editorial
duties and, furthermore, an inspirational leader of patriotic activities. Gringmut was
described as a fighter for ‘Russian rights’ who had waged ‘war with the enemies of
Russian unity.’40 V. P. Meshcherskii, an influential member of the tsarist court camarilla,
a confidant of Nicholas II, and the editor of the reactionary newspaper Grazhdanin
(Citizen), held that Gringmut’s role, unlike his editorial predecessor at Moskovskie vedo-
mosti Mikhail N. Katkov, had not been primarily as a thinker, but rather as a man of
action. He was declared to be a vozhd’, not merely a leader, but one with special strength
and vision. Gringmut represented a man of unbending personal will in a time of weak-
ness.41 Supporters praised the exponential growth of the monarchist movement, from a
handful of members in Moscow to several hundred branches throughout the empire,
which was said to be a result of his guidance.42
A series of book publications between 1910 and 1913 added to the tributes dedi-
cated to his memory. Gringmut’s collected works, consisting of essays, columns from
Moskovskie vedomosti and letters from across the Russian Empire addressed to him,
were re-published in collected form.43 Members of a number of monarchist organis-
ations including the RMP had written to major monarchist newspapers and journals,
such as Russkoe znamia (Russian Banner), Grazhdanin, Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia (Messen-
ger of the Russian Assembly), as well as the paper previously edited by Gringmut, Mos-
kovskie vedomosti, making some extravagant claims that he was the monarchist who had
given the movement its impetus. Some even claimed he had represented a spiritual
leader of the Russian nation.44
The Gringmut cult, far from criticising tsarism, even appeared to defend it. Indeed,
the official badge of the RMP was dedicated to Nicholas II, bearing a quote attributed to
him, ‘may my autocracy stay as of old.’ However, a significant result of the cult was the
construction of an alternative vision of monarchism, based not only on the same prin-
ciples of the regime but also on a profoundly pessimistic mood regarding the Russian
present. Rejection of political developments, such as the creation of the State Duma,
demonstrated a schism between official and populist monarchism, with many devotees
of the latter tendency resolutely opposed to such changes.45 Another wider point is how
much of the energy created by Gringmut’s deification had a negative focus, and was
directed against the enemies of the Russian state, rather than in pursuit of creating a
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positive ideal. Consequently, many of his followers did not view the status quo in Russia
with optimism. Gringmut, along with right-wing leaders G. V. Butmi, A. I. Dubrovin
and the commentator K. N. Paskhalov, was a monarchist who did not wish for any sort
of representational system in Russia.46 He instead wanted direct and ‘indivisible’ links
between leaders, organisations and people, and hence to dispense with any parliamen-
tary system.47 Above all, he saw the RMP as an all-class movement, beyond mere pol-
itical aims, and for ethnic Russians only. This theme was reflected throughout the
monarchist press, and at requiems and assemblies held for Gringmut, all of which
praised his memory. According to one recent analyst, ‘he declared that the black
hundred movement had a higher and greater aim: the desire of a national and religious
revival of the Russian people.’48
Unlike Alexander II, Gringmut had died of natural causes, so his own chance of
martyrdom was denied. Instead, he was given a role as a steadfast defender of
‘Russian’ values. Supporters such as Ioann Vostorgov depicted him as a man of the
people who had united the popular mood. In a speech given by Vostorgov at the
funeral, he stressed that at the event:
There were no crowds, no idlers and senseless gatherings, there was, in place of
this, a popular mood united in profound veneration and prayer . . . between us
we have seen that the death of Vladimir Andreevich was felt by thousands of
people, many circling his coffin, as the death was dear to native men, who have
rarely shed so many pure and just tears.49
The targeting of enemies, a common feature among the Russian right, was also
present in the tributes. This included recourse to anti-Semitism, a frequent feature of
the far right. Vostorgov referred to the ‘despicable words of one Jew’ in the press,
who had reportedly commented on the surprisingly low turnout at the funeral, some-
thing Vostorgov denied in his speech.50
The final piece in the development of the cult was a large monument that was
unveiled in the cemetery of the Skorbiashchenskii monastery in Moscow on 25 April
1910 (Figure 3). Supporters claimed this part of the cult was operating on a purely reli-
gious basis, and reportage of the event presented a series of Orthodox rituals. Unlike at
Gringmut’s funeral, the party organisation of the RMP did not figure as a prominent
presence at the unveiling.51 The monument was designed by the architect and artist
(and himself a member of the right-wing movements) Viktor P. Vasnetsov, and was
created by stonemason M. P. Ovchinnikov working in his shop. The body of the monu-
ment was constructed from only two pieces of granite. The top section of the edifice was
made out of one massive granite block hewn by stonemason V. I. Orlov into the shape of
an Orthodox cross. Another large piece of granite formed the base, and was inscribed
with words dedicated to V. A. Gringmut: ‘Orthodox Russian people: assemble, unite,
pray.’ The cross, which depicted icons of the Virgin Mary and the priest Ioann Bogoslov,
was sculpted from solid bronze and raised separately from the granite fascia. It report-
edly cost over 6,000 rubles to produce (Figure 4).52
The unveiling of the memorial was a major event for local monarchist groups,
including members from the Mogilev branch of the URP. Grazhdanin reported how Vos-
torgov had given a speech to a delegation composed from a variety of major monarchist
groups, with over 2,000 supporters present in all.53 Supporters had gathered to praise
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Gringmut’s life and works, chanting ‘Christ has risen! Christ has risen!’ and ‘God is with
us.’ Vostorgov declared at the unveiling of the monument, ‘it is wonderful to hear that
today we speak of you: look on the cross in silence, hear us cry for “true resurrection”,
hear us, and our words!’54 Gringmut’s values, including his supposed veneration of
Russia and the Russian people, commitment to Orthodoxy, and nationalist ideology
would live on, as supporters sought to ‘resurrect’ his ideas for a future age.55
However, not all monarchists were completely satisfied with the effusive praise that
the cult provided. Whilst Mikhail Men’shikov recognised the personal qualities of ‘will’
and ‘unwavering service’ that Gringmut had given to the monarchist movement, he saw
him primarily as a man betrayed by dark forces from the era. Men’shikov, a regular con-
tributor to Aleksei Suvorin’s influential St Petersburg-based daily newspaper Novoe
vremia, considered that Gringmut had been ignored by Russia’s rulers ‘not because he
did not have anything to teach them, but because the state idea was largely calibrated
around a great many bureaucratic goals. And therefore Gringmut, like the majority
of our publicists, wrote mainly for the bureaucracy.’ Gringmut’s death was interpreted
by some on the right not as a sorrowful passing, but as a prelude to catastrophe, with
Men’shikov claiming his life had demonstrated the weakness of the autonomous right.56
Men’shikov’s diatribe reveals another aspect to the Gringmut cult. Though it appeared
to have been peaceful, a wider mood of pessimism underscored a rejection of the reali-
ties of Russia’s present. The spurning of political realities demonstrates a divide between
the actions of the regime and the view of Russia’s present as adopted by right-wing
radicals.
FIGURE 3 Gringmut’s monument, Mogilev, 25 April 1910.
Source: Vladimir Andreevich Gringmut: ocherk ego zhizni i deiatel’nosti, Moscow: A. A. Levenson,
1913, p. 123. Courtesy of the Slavonic Library, National Library of Finland.
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URP funerals in Ukraine, 1905–1907: populism, anti-Semitism and
violence
A particular stimulus for criticism of the Russian present was the presence of other
social, political and national groups. On the imperial periphery, such conflict was
more marked. This was particularly so in Ukraine, and especially in Odessa. Founded
in 1794, the late nineteenth-century Odessa was the largest city in Ukraine and the
fourth largest in the Russian Empire. It was an ethnically diverse city with many immi-
grant communities. Large numbers of people came in and out of the city’s busy port area
on a daily basis. One notable aspect of the city’s demographics was its large Jewish popu-
lation; demographic data from the final years of the empire show a sizeable community.
In 1904, 31.31 per cent of Odessa’s overall population of 511,000 was Jewish.57 The
city was very prosperous, with many of its Jewish residents involved in the mercantile
industries and financially successful, though this success was compromised by harsh
restrictions on their civil liberties. However, tensions between Jewish and non-Jewish
FIGURE 4 The Gringmut monument unveiled to crowds of monarchists, 25 April 1910.
Source: Vladimir Andreevich Gringmut: ocherk ego zhizni i deiatel’nosti, Moscow: A. A. Levenson,
1913, p. 121. Courtesy of the Slavonic Library, National Library of Finland.
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residents were bubbling underneath the relative wealth of the city, giving right-wing
forces scope with which to use anti-Semitism as a tool to mobilise the masses. This
aggression did not go unchallenged: the presence of active and well-organised Jewish
self-defence forces in Odessa led to fierce recriminations, and violence emerged as a
central element of right-wing activity there.
The membership of the far right was increasing immediately after the revolution of
1905. By 1907, the largest right-wing group, the URP, claimed around 1,000 branches
across the Russian Empire.58 An estimate of the total membership of the organisation in
the same year can be arrived at via examining police records in the Russian State
Archive, which show between 300,000 and 400,000 members.59 A particularly active
branch was in Odessa, established at the end of 1905, and led by Count Aleksei
I. Konovnitsyn. He was particularly active recruiting workers from the dock areas,
and presented his movement as one dedicated to ‘the Russian people.’ This was in
stark contrast to the small-scale, elitist groups that had existed before 1905, such as
the Russian Assembly. A widespread perception amongst supporters of the URP in
Odessa was that the city was home to many revolutionary subversives and wealthy
Jews, who oppressed poor Orthodox Russians. This became a key part of their propa-
ganda.60 The far right portrayed a scenario in newspapers such as Russkoe znamia that
being in a revolutionary group such as the Bund was typical of Odessa’s Jews.61
Populism was a central element of the right’s message during and after 1905. In
Odessa and other parts of Ukraine, one strategy for popular mobilisation was holding
public funerals for ex-members of the right-wing parties, many of who were workers
who had joined the groups due to the recruitment efforts of the likes of Konovnitsyn.
These public processions were initially presented by supporters of these groups and the
right-wing press as detached and sacrosanct events that had little to do with everyday
political activity. Like the Gringmut case, much of the symbolism of these events utilised
the triad of ‘Russian’ values of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality that needed to be
defended in a time of contemporary decline. One addition to the URP’s message in
Odessa was how it presented itself as a movement in defence of the masses, as well
as of the three central values of the triad decreed by the Minister of Education,
Sergei Uvarov, in 1831: Orthodoxy, autocracy and Russian nationality. The populist
element in the right-wing message resulted in additional tensions, with funerals held
for rightist workers providing an opportunity for far-right groups to portray themselves
as defenders of ‘the people.’62 Russian rightists frequently presented themselves as under
attack from external threats: the funerals and processions held for workers, and the
demonstrations and chants accompanying them, were designed not to promote
leaders or statesmen, but instead everyday ‘true Russian’ people.63 The image of the
sanctity of the Russian worker was added to longstanding values of Orthodoxy and
nationalism, creating a synthesis on the far right between populism and official nation-
ality. Intriguingly, the presentation of images of the people had changed in the case of
these funerals. The people were no longer merely passive receptors of the ideas of
leaders as they had been in previous scenarios, but were the central focus of the
right-wing mythos. Funerals for members of right-wing workers’ groups acted as a
trigger for waves of violence in defence of ‘the masses’ or common people against an
‘enemy within’ threatening to destroy Russia.64
The ‘enemy within’ was often depicted to be a Jewish one. Anti-Semitism was a
central element of these popular events: crowds were invited by leaders to take out
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their anger on local Jewish populations.65 One funeral in Kherson province in Ukraine
was held for the URP activist, and worker on the Odessa docks, Aleksandr Prokhorov
on 28 February 1907. He had been killed in a clash between URP and revolutionary
forces. His funeral was held in the nearby Kherson cemetery. Supervised by leaders
of the local branch, A. A. Bankovskii and M. I. Ivanov, a police report noted how
after the memorial service a crowd of several hundred URP activists were invited to
‘unite for the fight with enemies’, crying ‘Russia is on the march! (Rus’ idet) and
‘hurray!’ whilst promising to wage war, most of all against Odessa’s Jews. Led by Bank-
ovskii, the crowd carried banners, including the Russian national flag, filing down Pet-
rovskii and Alekseevskii streets. A pogrom started and shops considered ‘Jewish’-
looking had their windows smashed with bottles and stones and were set on fire.
Scores of onlookers were injured in the chaos that engulfed the town centre. The vio-
lence subsided by the following day, but the sudden nature of these acts of violence had
caused panic in the town centre and created an air of tension amongst residents.66
In other parts of Ukraine, members of the URP presented themselves as defenders
of Russia against subversives, and in particular Jews. A report in the rightist paper Russ-
kaia rech’ (Russian Speech) dating from 12 May 1907 described a procession of at least
10,000 people in Ekaterinburg who had filed into the town centre via Preobrazhenskii
Street. Religion was central to this construction of popular anti-Semitism: the proces-
sion was allegedly raised in protest at the disruption of an Orthodox funeral a few days
earlier. URP activists amongst the demonstrators called for the ‘defence’ of a tra-
ditional, idealised Russia against revolutionary agitators, leftists and Jews, and declared
that Orthodox Russians were ‘naturally well-intentioned’ in contrast to such enemies.
The URP activists at this demonstration declared the disruption of the funeral to be an
attack on Russian religion. One orator declared, ‘what has it come to, when we are
unable to give a quiet burial in the Christian tradition for a Russian man?’ The
houses of forces the right considered as their enemies, chiefly leftist students and
Jews, were targeted in violent reprisals.67 The scale of this activity around ritual dem-
onstrations shows that this popular anti-Semitism was making inroads into mobilising
the local population.
A funeral held in Odessa for Polivanov, a member of a right-wing workers’ organ-
isation called the Russian Society for Trade and Industry (a small group related to the
URP combat units in the town), attracted bands of URP supporters, who urged violence
against Jews and leftists, often presented as indistinguishable in related propaganda. This
was portrayed as revenge for Polivanov’s death, supposedly at the hands of Jewish revo-
lutionaries operating within the city.68 In another instance, right-wing activists exploited
the shady circumstances of the murder of a city official in order to pose as the defenders
of officialdom against attacks from left-wing radicals. This funeral provided rightists
with what they perceived as an opportunity to pose as the defenders of law and
order against what they described as waves of revolutionary violence and destruction.
The Russian-Jewish newspaper Voskhod (Dawn) reported on the presence of
A. F. Girs, assistant governor-general of Odessa, at the funeral for a murdered local offi-
cial, Pogrebnii. Addressing crowds of supporters at the event, Girs placed the blame for
Pogrebnii’s murder on Jewish revolutionaries. He stated at the funeral, ‘when we stand
in place with the town governor we only ask: what for?’ The solution was revenge
attacks: ‘brothers, take vengeance!’ Rightists interpreted this as a call for violence
and destruction; shops were looted and Jewish youths and students were attacked by
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bands of hooligans. The paper protested that it was in fact non-Jewish revolutionaries
who had murdered Pogrebnii, though this did not seem to matter in the chaos that fol-
lowed.69 In a similar example, crowds of URP activists assembled at the Old Christian
cemetery in Odessa after the recent death of a police official, Kharchenko, protesting
that he had been killed by revolutionaries. However, in this case URP activists promised
to bring violence upon all the enemies of Russia, and not only Jews.
The URP presented their funerals as religious and spiritual events that were dis-
rupted by subversive forces. However, though URP activists claimed to support the
regime, many police reports displayed concerns about the potential for these events
to turn into sites of mass unrest. The question of violence was central to this. Increas-
ingly, the spontaneity of the right was feared by local authorities, in no small part due to
the responses that they could elicit from other elements of the community. Police
reports noted this and requested the banning of ‘political elements from the religious
processions’, a demarcation that included the far right.70 In Odessa, a large city far
from the imperial centres of Moscow and St Petersburg, Russia’s rulers were keen to
contain all possible sources of disruption. One example was when a delegation from
the Odessa branch of the URP under the leadership of Count Aleksei Konovnitsyn
appeared at the funeral for a member of the URP killed in clashes with revolutionaries
in the city in November 1907. The delegation drew revolvers from their pockets and
gave a ten-shot salute for the deceased. Unsurprisingly given the violent actions of
URP fighting organisations (druzhiny) at universities and workers’ meetings in Odessa
over the previous several days, undercover police agents at the funeral were concerned
by the presence of armed crowds of right-wing activists.71 The special section of the
police often sent agents to monitor such events.72
A particular concern was the emergence of Jewish self-defence groups, which
carried out acts of violence in response to the right’s activities.73 At the funeral held
in early September 1907 for a police official, Kharchenko, URP activists converged
on the surrounding streets and at a nearby hospital, urging retribution against the
‘Jews’ who ‘murdered’ him, and presented Kharchenko as a martyred victim of revolu-
tionary violence. The atmosphere in the neighbourhood following the interment of
Kharchenko was so tense that it was feared another pogrom, like the one of October
1905, could break out in Odessa. Faced with this possibility, officials from the police
and the army, led by the mayor of the city, V. D. Novitskii, colluded to stop fresh out-
breaks of violence by increasing the police presence and arresting wandering bands of
URP activists. This crackdown was pursued due to the fear of the violent nature of
many of the ‘riff-raff’ in the URP, and the appearance of Jewish self-defence groups
in response to promises of violence to be carried out against Odessa’s Jews. On 3 Sep-
tember 1907, one of the Jewish self-defence forces, the Young Will, appeared after a
band of URP supporters had assembled outside a Jewish hospital, whereupon several
of the followers of the group brandished revolvers and fired shots into nearby crowds
of rightist activists. It is unclear how many died in this collision, but it certainly
caused a panic, and was reported in many newspapers in the following days. Groups
of black-shirted URP activists, themselves armed, fled at the appearance of this well-
organised and destructive group that adopted a fight-fire-with-fire approach and was
prepared to meet right-wing destructiveness with its own decisive measures.74
The URP was hardly unique amongst rightist organisations in adopting a populist
and demagogic style – that trend was almost universal on the right – but was distinct
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in that it came closest to achieving the monarchist aim of mass mobilisation. URP rituals
called for the steadfast defence of Russia and its values but, in contrast to the case of the
RMP cited above, these funerals and their associated demonstrations had a more mili-
tant, demagogic and violent character. The difference in the rituals adopted shows the
fractured nature of the monarchist movement. Though it had been tried before under
the hand of the government through the Zubatov experiment, monarchist populism
was expanding and developing away from the autocracy. The actions of groups such
as the URP showed how an alternate vision of monarchism was in development
amongst the most extreme factions on the right.75 Instances of URP involvement in
right-wing terrorism, such as the attempt on the life of Prime Minister Sergei Witte,
in addition to the chaotic rightist mob violence that accompanied many of its public
activities, show the means that some elements on the right were prepared to adopt
to achieve a ‘united and indivisible’ Russia.76 However, the regime was suspicious of
such autonomous activity. The governor-general of Odessa, I. N. Tolmachev, took
steps to ban the URP and other radical rightists from processions held in Odessa on
22 August 1907, after they had appeared at the funerals of townsfolk murdered in
clashes between revolutionaries and right-wing groups from 18 to 20 August.77 Inci-
dences of unrest from the past few years, not least the widespread peasant disturbances
that had occurred across the empire during the revolution of 1905, doubtless served to
influence such attitudes.78
Bessarabia Centenary, 1912: nationalism and identity on the
imperial periphery
A final instance showing the right’s independent approach to the creation of both Russian
and non-Russian identities was the UAM’s involvement in the celebrations marking 100
years since Bessarabia became part of the Russian Empire, held between May and June
1912. Bessarabia was a territory annexed after the war of 1806–12 against Turkey, and
incorporated many Orthodox believers into the Russian Empire, a point that would be
of fundamental importance in the right’s construction of the rituals at the centennial.
Like the more famous Poltava and Romanov celebrations, the Bessarabia centennial
was designed to demonstrate the greatness of the Russian Empire and the Russian
people.79 How to organise the celebrations set off fierce arguments between two differ-
ent groups behind the centennial. Central to this conflict was a conception of Russian
identity, integral to the right-wing view of how the commemoration was to be pre-
sented. What emerged were two concepts of nationalism, one associated with the
council originally behind organising the centennial, and another associated with indepen-
dent right-wing tendencies in the region.
Arguments over Bessarabia’s identity and its place in the Russian Empire show the
controversy that the nationality question could engender. The two different groups that
emerged had divergent views on whether it was religion or nation that should be the
central element in the construction of the rituals surrounding the occasion. A. N. Kru-
penskii, a marshal of the nobility in Bessarabia province from 1908 to 1912, was the
leader of the official council for the organisation of the centenary, which first met on
10 May 1911. His view, like that of others on the council, was that the centenary
should celebrate Bessarabia’s position within the Russian Empire as part of a ‘family
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of peoples’ (sem’ia narodov). Krupenskii perceived Bessarabia’s role as one of the many
members of the imperial family. This was in contrast to the autonomous right-wing
version.80 This was, most of all, associated with the right-wing delegate to the Third
and Fourth State Dumas from Bessarabia and the leader of the UAM, Vladimir Purish-
kevich, with one of his most notable associates in the region being the monk Serafim
(Chichagov), Bishop of Kishinev and a leader of the Bessarabia branch of the URP.81
Echoing the official position, right-wingers in Bessarabia supported the ‘nationalisation’
of Bessarabia, in essence a variation of the regime’s Russification policy. However, in
contrast to the official organisational council, the radical right, led by the UAM leader-
ship in the region and supported by Serafim’s propaganda activities, believed that it was
religion, rather than nation, that was the key to the successful promotion of the centen-
ary of Bessarabia’s unity with the Russian Empire, particularly due to Bessarabia’s demo-
graphics. Serafim perceived that Bessarabia was not only separate from Moldova, but had
a culture closer to that of the Russian people due to the Orthodox nature of many of its
inhabitants (for Serafim, like many rightists, to be a ‘truly Russian’ citizen meant that
one had to believe in the Russian Orthodox religion).82
The importance of whether the stress of the ceremonials lay on religion or nation
can be seen by the activities of the right in the run-up to the official celebrations. Ser-
afim’s activities, which included hosting meetings amongst Bessarabia’s population that
inspired the need for a spiritual revival, were of no small concern to Krupenskii and
several of his associates on the official council. Serafim had been actively spreading a
message amongst the population in Kishinev that Russia was undergoing a process of
‘spiritual rebirth.’83 The targets of Serafim’s speeches were mainly peasants, whom
he considered to be good subjects of the tsar. This concerned the committee, as the
potential for spontaneous and popular demonstration was all the greater should
Serafim be successful in arousing vitriol in the peasants of Kishinev. Serafim held that
the ‘truly Orthodox’ subjects of Nicholas needed to be united, and to achieve this he
believed that the rituals of the centenary should be constructed around a religious frame-
work. Activists from the UAM and the URP lobbied the organisational council to change
the potential presentation of the ceremonials in the first half of 1912. Midway through
the year, Krupenskii resigned from his position as the chair of the committee, probably
due to pressure from the right. After this, the right had more leeway to take a greater
role in the planning of the ceremonials.84 Unlike other celebrations from around the
same time, such as the Poltava bicentennial or the Romanov tercentenary, the right
was not merely present at the Bessarabia centennial, but took a direct role in shaping
how the ceremonials would be conducted in the region. Purishkevich and Serafim’s
pressure had told in producing a re-shuffled committee, one more receptive to right-
wing ideas.
The ceremonials in Kishinev that followed demonstrated the rightist conviction that
religion was the central lodestone around which to construct the identity of Bessarabia,
given the presence of Orthodox believers. Orthodoxy was portrayed as the bridge
between Bessarabia and the rest of the empire, as it was in Kholm, where rightists
placed pressure on the government to take action against the Roman Catholic population
on the part of ‘truly Russian’ men (istinno-Russkie liudi).85 Furthermore, religion played
a major role in the tsar’s own view of the events. An official bulletin on the joining of
Bessarabia to the Russian Empire, dated 5 May 1912 and signed by Nicholas II himself,
noted ‘the memorable event that saw hundreds of thousands of Orthodox Christians of
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the same faith take on total Russian citizenship.’86 Rightist leaders such as Serafim were
confident in the success of the celebrations, especially given that the tsar agreed with
their interpretation of events. On 16 May 1912 a right-wing demonstration, a jubilee
parade, was held in Kishinev. By eight in the morning, a crowd had gathered outside
the cathedral, led by Serafim, though accompanied by many other priests and
bishops. After the liturgy prayers were sung to the tsar and to Russia. The procession
then took to the town square, where members of the Kishinev branch of the URP, stu-
dents from the nearby school, peasant choirs and various townsfolk had gathered. A
central element in this ceremony was the rightist desire to claim mass support and to
function purely as a voice for ‘the people’, ostensibly in opposition to the intelligentsia.
An editorial in Purishkevich’s journal Priamoi put’ (Straight Path) when reporting on the
event noted with some pleasure that ‘the intelligentsia and the middle classes (sredniaia
publika) were excluded from the service.’87 One of the key distinctions between the right
and the establishment was the use of such populist messages.88
Rightist ritual activity continued in Bessarabia once the centenary had passed. In
December 1912, Priamoi put’ reported on the work of the ‘patriotic league’ in Bessar-
abia, a group related to the UAM. After the panikhida, dedicated to ‘victims of the years
of troubles’ (smutnye gody), prayers were offered to the health of the tsar. Like the Gring-
mut funeral, the panikhida demonstrated the centrality of the revolution of 1905 to the
monarchist mindset. In the services held, the present era was referred to as a second
‘time of troubles’, after the first between the death of Feodor Ivanovich in 1598 and
the installation of the Romanov dynasty in 1613. I. V. Malinovskii, the chair of the Kishi-
nev branch of the UAM, welcomed the forthcoming collection of patriotic holidays and
dedicated his speech to the victims of the revolution of 1905. The main aim of the UAM
at this time was, as earlier in the year, to ‘unite the Christian population of Bessarabia.’
The focus was on both tsar and people. As in the example of Sergei Aleksandrovich, the
idea of ‘victimhood’ is important. The suffering ‘good’ people had died at the hands of
villainous revolutionaries, much like Sergei himself.89 When the imperial family was
welcomed by a delegation of right-wing groups in Kishinev in June 1914, love for
Russian religion as well as love for the Russian tsar was proclaimed.90
However, these visions were much contested and inflamed rival nationalisms, as
demonstrated by counterdemonstrations, which occurred throughout 1912. The
UAM view that a religious and chauvinistic campaign would unite the Russian elements
in Bessarabia also had the effect of bringing out into the open Romanian nationalist
groups. The transformation of the town centre in Loov (located in Ismail district, Bes-
sarabia) included the public display of Russian symbols, such as flags and Orthodox
crosses, and the illumination of the town square in the colours of the imperial standard
at night. On 6 May at two o’clock in the afternoon, cries and shouts were heard from the
Romanian section of the town, together with ‘the sound of a funeral march.’ A large
crowd of passers-by had gathered around the wharf area. This included a large group
in Romanian national dress, with a full brass band playing the Romanian national
anthem. A counterdemonstration by members of the crowd playing the Russian national
anthem seems to have raised the temperature of the events, whereupon the police were
called. They asked the pro-Romanian demonstrators to leave and they peacefully com-
plied.91 Police reports monitoring the mood of the people in Bessarabia made frequent
reference throughout May and June 1912 to the upturn in Romanian nationalism and
anti-Russian demonstrations. Rather than showing a united pro-Russian front
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amongst the townsfolk as was hoped, the celebrations helped to exacerbate divisions
amongst many residents, though there was notably little in the way of actual violence.92
The role of the right in the Bessarabia ceremonies, on the face of it a victory for the
right in terms of producing an organising council more conducive to right-wing ideas, in
fact points towards several of the limitations of rightist rituals. Rightists mainly utilised
pre-Petrine forms of worship: Russian Orthodox hymns and ceremonials, banners in
Church Slavonic, liturgies and hymns. These rituals in Bessarabia were structured
around the Church. Modern, national ideologies of nation-building were largely
absent from right-wing discourse. Instead, they stuck to a strictly prescribed high
culture: a heroic, puritan, and ascetic set of rituals and symbols that appeared authentic
to their own members, but were of limited appeal in a multi-confessional, poly-ethnic
empire. In Bessarabia, where citizens whom the UAM and other right-wing groups
would have considered ‘true Russians’ were in the minority, this was especially limiting.
Indeed, rival nationalist groups were if anything provoked by the right’s activities. The
rightist-organised celebrations led to a more divisive set of ceremonials than may have
been the case had the regime’s original plans been followed. Consequently, the rightist
notion of popular observance was shown to be more problematic than their leaders had
initially intended.
Conclusion
The death of a leader of the right, the activities of militant factions in Ukraine and the
work of the right in influencing an official demonstration, when considered together,
show that the right was not a uniform entity, but one of contrast and ambiguity. But
these cases do possess several consistent features. The ancient symbols of religious
Orthodoxy were used to situate these ritual activities on a different level from political
problems in contemporary Russia, which activists widely perceived to be negative.
Themes that play a large role in the Christian tradition featured heavily. A concept of
‘shared suffering’ involving a rightist leader, then the followers, emerges. Using estab-
lished themes did not, however, stop the rituals becoming the subject of controversy,
from the perspective of both the regime and Jewish self-defence groups in Odessa,
and for Romanian nationalists in Bessarabia. The creation of these conflicts was obviously
an end that right-wing groups such as the URP and the UAM desired, as can be seen
from their fanning of tensions across the empire, but the extent to which this ended
up proving counter-productive to their aims in other areas was not fully anticipated.
Other national, religious and political groups were frequently at odds with right-
wing activists, and whilst rightists themselves may not have represented a subversive
presence, the suspicions of the authorities were only sharpened by their tendency to
cause controversy. In every example pronounced dissatisfaction with the status quo
emerges, demonstrated by a widespread rejection of Russian modernity, including
verbal criticism of the State Duma, or even the use of violence in reaction to wider
socio-political developments occurring in the Russian Empire. These developments rep-
resented the fracturing of groups in support of the autocracy.
Furthermore, rightists were beginning to develop a view of monarchism quite
different from that adopted by the regime in previous decades. In Ukraine, a central the-
matic departure centred on the conception of the narod in the right’s scenario. Unlike the
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case with those of the imperial regime, the people had progressed from observers to
participants and, finally, to the central subjects in the rituals of the radical right, as
the URP attempted to create its own idea of sacred space via public rituals using
ideas of the purity of the Russian people. Conceptions of the Russian nation, as
opposed to the Russian people, played a lesser role. One of the most notable elements
of this was populism – in one respect, the ideology of the right mirrored that of the
populist movement of the 1860s and 1870s in giving ‘the people’ cult-like status.93
Therefore, in addition to the right’s self-presentation as protectors of the autocratic tra-
dition, activists demonstrated a more widely held desire to create a mass appeal. When
considering why right-wing mass mobilisation did not generate an even wider pull, the
conflicts caused by their activities provide one explanation, but another is the lack of
originality and pronounced negativity of right-wing symbolism in itself. The right’s
ideology did not in fact go far enough in providing a genuinely popular alternative to
left-wing and liberal movements. The inadequately developed symbolic and political
emblems of the far right, many of which were derivative of the regime’s own religious
and popular ideals, were, in the long run, insufficient for rightist aspirations. The right
instead placed much of its energy into creating wholly negative emblems, such as the
pursuit of ‘enemies of the people’ – groups including Jews and bureaucrats.94 Unlike
certain right-wing tendencies in twentieth-century Europe, the Russian right did not
manage to find genuinely popular symbols and rituals that had wide social appeal,
and ended up caught between the ideas of elitist gentry organisations and a demagogical,
incomplete populist nationalism. These tactical shortcomings had the implication that by
the outbreak of war in 1914 the right was much depleted as an independent force. Such
failures left in tatters its desire to unite the Russian Empire as an army of many millions
and, eventually, would pave the way for revolution.
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alist and rightist circles in this period. See Loukianov, ‘“Russia for Russians” or “Russia
for Russian Subjects”?’, 87.
14. In one issue of Church News from 1909, Vostorgov praised Peter as a hero, warrior
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archist Union and a prominent URP activist who gave speeches about the movement
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17. Some sociological analyses of ritual can be found in Geertz, ‘Religion as a Cultural
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